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Managing Business Performance: the contrasting cases of two multiple 
retailers 1920 to 1939 
Business performance measurement and management (PMM) systems are often 
viewed as relatively recent phenomena, responding to the failure of historical 
practices which prioritised financial measures. But despite the considerable focus 
on these systems over the last 25 years, they have not lived up to their early 
promise. This paper looks backwards to understand how practitioners managed 
their performance in the past. It focuses on two British multiple retailers between 
1920 and 1939 and highlights not only the formal processes they adopted but also 
the role of the informal processes which shaped how they achieved their 
objectives.  
Keywords: business performance management, business performance 
measurement, balanced scorecard, retail, business history 
 
Introduction 
In 1992, Robert Kaplan and David Norton published ‘The Balanced Scorecard - 
Measures that Drive Performance.’ The article called for a complete rethink on how 
companies measure their performance and captured the interest of both academics and 
practitioners alike.1 It was not the first to challenge how firms measure their 
performance but its popularity triggered what was subsequently described as a 
‘revolution’ which continues to this day.2 However, while the subject may have had its 
roots in measurement, it has evolved and broadened over the last 25 years. Lebas argued 
that performance measurement is inseparable from performance management as one 
creates the context for the other.3 Kaplan and Norton’s own contributions have shifted 
from an emphasis on measurement systems to management systems where 
measurement is just one part of a wider system.4 Similarly, Bititci et al. placed 
performance measurement within a wider performance management system. In their 
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widely-cited definition, they describe a process by which the company manages its 
performance in line with its corporate and functional strategies and objectives. And, the 
performance measurement system, which forms part of it, provides the feedback to 
make appropriate management decisions.5 It is this wider context that is the subject of 
this paper and will be referred to as performance measurement and management 
(PMM).6 
Despite the considerable focus on PMM systems over the last 25 years, it is not 
clear that they have been a success in practice. Firms have struggled to implement 
systems and research has failed to provide consistent evidence that these systems 
actually improve performance.7 H.T. Johnson, whose work with Kaplan on ‘Relevance 
Lost’ did so much to trigger the performance measurement revolution, has gone even 
further. Provocatively, he concludes that not only are measures and targets not needed 
to manage performance but that the on-going focus on them can harm the long-term 
performance of the organisation.8 Some of the most published researchers in the field 
now question our current understanding of PMM. They argue that the discipline is at a 
‘cross-roads’, that ‘our understanding of this field is far from complete’ and requires ‘a 
complete re-think’.9 
In considering the issues, the literature too often overlooks the experience of 
firms in the past. Consideration of how to manage performance and how to use the 
statistics increasingly available to them has long been a concern for organisations, 
particularly as they developed from small-scale to large scale and from single-unit to 
multi-unit businesses. The conventional narrative describes the focus of pre-1960’s 
performance measurement and management on the supply side; costs needed to be 
minimised, work was primarily manual and management systems were based on 
prescriptive procedures and controls.10 However, this understates the importance of the 
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service sector and particularly the large-scale retail sector which emerged at the end of 
the 19th century. Their management practices focused on the demand side: on the 
customer and the ‘knowledgeable’ employee who had to understand not only their 
customers but also the products they had (or had to acquire) to meet their changing 
needs. In multiple retail, managing the performance of the business was further 
complicated by distance. Head Offices were not only distant from their customers but 
also their employees who were responsible for managing the relationship with the 
customer. 
This paper will compare the experiences of two British multiple retailers 
between 1920 and 1939 to understand how they used measures and managed their 
performance during a volatile period economically but innovative period managerially. 
Boots Pure Drug Company (Boots) and WH Smith and Sons (WHS) were already well-
established firms by 1920. WHS, founded in 1792, was a traditionally managed firm 
with structures which had evolved slowly over the previous century. In 1920, it was still 
owned by the Smith family and managed by a small group of Partners comprising 
family members or close family friends. In contrast, Boots was bought by the United 
Drug Company of the United States in 1920 and immediately introduced the innovative 
structures of its parent company’s retail business (Liggett’s). In comparing the PMM 
structures of the two firms, the aim is not to identify the differences but rather the 
similarities and, in understanding these, to provide insights which may help answer 
questions being raised about modern PMM systems. 
Approach 
To compare the two firms, data collection, analysis and presentation has been informed 
by Ferreira and Otley’s ‘extended framework for analysis of performance management 
systems’.11 The framework was developed as a research tool for describing the structure 
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and operations of these systems in a holistic manner and was based on an earlier model 
developed by Otley.12 It was a response to criticism that much of the existing research 
into PMM’s had been based on simplified and partial settings.13  
The framework has been modified to avoid obviously anachronistic terminology 
and some of the separate elements in Ferreira and Otley’s framework have been merged 
to simplify presentation. The framework is based on a series of questions grouped under 
the principal components of a PMM system (see table 1).  
Table 1: Framework (near here) 
 
Although the framework was developed to help researchers conduct case studies 
on modern management structures and processes, it has been used in this paper to 
facilitate a comparative historical study. The interplay of past and present has long been 
a feature of historiography and understanding the present including frameworks, 
methods and theories, are considered by some to be essential to understanding the 
past.14 This becomes increasingly important as historians engage with other 
management disciplines with different epistemological approaches. The differences, 
however, rather than barriers to co-operation, can alternatively represent opportunities 
for both to explore new ways of working and to generate different types of scholarly 
understanding.15 Kipping and Üsdiken, for example, have highlighted how models and 
frameworks have been used to improve our understanding of the past. But, this 
understanding has in turn developed a historical cognizance among those investigating 
organizational and management phenomena.16 
However, the use of a modern framework poses some risks. First, it can imply a 
normative structure. This is a particular risk in PMM where a number of the frameworks 
developed over the last 30 years, such as the Balanced Scorecard, were explicitly 
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created to improve the link between strategy and operations. Ferreira and Otley, 
although acknowledging the risk, emphasise that their framework is simply a heuristic 
tool which helps to document the ‘as is’ rather than describing the ‘what should be’ and 
does not pre-suppose that a system is already in place.  
Secondly, using a modern framework could be considered anachronistic. 
However, other than changes in the terminology, there is sufficient evidence to suggest 
that both businesses and contemporary academics considered performance holistically 
during the period of this study (1920 to 1939). The growth in multiple retail after the 
First World War generated considerable innovation in management practices with 
substantial input from management academics. Harvard produced its first volume of 
retail case studies in 1922 and these were revised regularly over the following 20 
years.17 The pace of change was such that some academics were left despairing: 
‘Control methods in large retail establishments are at present in such a state of 
continuous flux that it seems almost futile to attempt a consideration of the subject in a 
book’.18 While the books and articles were not structured in the same way as the 
framework, their coverage was as broad. Hayward and White, for example, described 
the ‘principles’ of chain store management rather than the objectives and referred to 
alleviating ‘problems’ rather than improving performance. However, the solutions they 
described could populate the framework. The chapter on ‘Centralising Executive 
Control’ showed, for example, the hierarchical structure below the Executive, the 
financial and non-financial measures generated for the Executives and the timing and 
frequency of meetings used to evaluate the measures. 19 Business historians such as 
Chandler, Jones and Fear have also shown that businesses have long thought about their 
structures holistically and the linkages between strategy, structure, operations and 
culture. 20 
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The Case Studies 
Boots and WHS were both well established and successful multiple retailers by 
1920. However, their evolutions had been quite different (see table 2). Although WHS 
was the much older firm, it had seen little evolution in its organizational structures and, 
following Grenier, still adopted an individualistic management style while in Boots, the 
crisis of leadership brought about by the American acquisition created a more directive 
style.21 
 
Table 2: Chronological summary (near here) 
 
Boots Pure Drug Company 
In 1920, Boots was sold by its founder, Jesse Boot, to the United Drug Company of the 
United States. He had built up the business from a single store in Nottingham selling 
herbal remedies in 1863 to the largest chain of retail Chemists in the World by 1906.22 
Boot was a discount retailer – he bought directly from manufacturers and undertook 
some manufacturing himself, aggressively advertised his competitive prices and rapidly 
expanded the number of branches.23 In 1920, Boot accepted an offer for the business 
from Louis Liggett of the American firm, United Drug Company.24 Although the largest 
drug store chain in the United States, United Drug’s retail operations (Liggett’s) were 
relatively small with only 211 stores.25 The Americans retained control until 1933 when 
financial problems in their own country forced a disposal and Boots once again became 
a public company.  
Apart from reorganizing the business in the early 1920’s, the Americans left the 
running of the business to an Executive Committee led by Jesse Boot’s son, John. He 
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became Joint Managing Director in 1920 and ran the business after the Americans sold 
it until his retirement in 1953.26  
Performance objectives 
In 1921, any reader of the editorial in the first edition of a new company magazine, The 
Bee, would have had little doubt about the objectives of the company: ‘But our whole 
living - our salaries - our reputation are summed up in our magazine slogan - more 
sales.’ On the opening page, the Sales Manager exhorted ‘colleagues and salesmen’ to 
‘LET US GO AFTER MORE VOLUME IN REAL EARNEST.’ 27 It was a theme 
repeated in articles over the coming months and years. It was consistent with the firm’s 
history and the objectives of the US parent company. It was an objective which lasted 
well beyond the period covered by this paper; in 1966, the Managing Director conceded 
that ‘regrettably, when it comes to the pinch many of our people still react in the 
traditional Boots way of sales at any price.’28 
Sales growth was achieved through driving volume and the terms ‘sales’ and 
‘volume’ were used interchangeably. Products were heavily promoted and they prided 
themselves on customer service. ‘The customer is always right’ stressed John Boot’s 
‘Service Letter No. 1’ and store managers could not refuse customers a product refund 
without referring to Head Office.29 
Improvement in gross margin and control over costs were also important 
objectives of the organization but less prominent in communications. Margin in 
particular was a priority for Head Office senior managers. Sales volume allowed the 
business to secure supplier discounts but the business had also manufactured its own 
products since the 1880’s. A new factory completed in the early 1930’s contributed to a 
substantial increase in ‘own-goods’ production.30 And, although enabled by sales 
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volume, it was gross margin improvement which was the single biggest contributor to 
the significant profit improvement between 1922 and 1939.31 
Organisational Structure 
Prior to the American acquisition, Jesse Boot had run a business with little formal 
structure.32 The Americans brought organisation. George Gales was seconded from the 
American business and appointed Managing Director. Gales was a strong advocate of 
organisation (‘the greatest asset we have is organisation, greater in value than all the 
other assets combined’) and introduced Liggett’s ‘American’ system.33 Two Boots 
directors (John Boot and Greenwood) toured the US in Autumn 1920 to understand how 
the system worked in practice.34 While Greenwood was disappointed with the quality of 
the American stores, he was impressed with the organizational structures and in his 
biography ascribed the financial success of the business in the 1920’s to the methods 
introduced by the Americans. 35 It was also recognized at the time. In 1923, The 
Financial Times conceded that ‘the introduction of the American element has certainly 
done the company no harm. It has very much livened up the administration and has 
modernised executive methods.’36  
The organisation structure was relatively simple, performance oriented and 
reflected a belief that in a sales based operation, the gap between the shops and directors 
should be as narrow as possible: 
‘Our present organisation is designed for the purpose of achieving definite business 
results, and at the same time of achieving those results in the most human and 
sympathetic manner by obtaining the fullest possible amount of direct personal 
contact between those responsible for the management of the business and the 
entire retail staff.’37 
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It was run as a single unit with no autonomous divisions. In 1920, it was the 
shops which had the primary responsibility for delivering the performance. Store 
managers chose those products bought by Head Office suitable for their customers. 
Store managers, as well as the Executive, were profit accountable while buying 
departments were not. 
Although the company had a Board which included members of the US parent 
company (and later external directors), it was the Executive Committee who were 
responsible for the operational management of the retail business.38 It had a strong 
‘performance’ bias. The seven members included both a newly created Expense 
Controller and a Chief Accountant. The Expense Controller (Greenwood) was 
responsible for store profitability and despite the job title, his remit extended beyond 
expenses. He frequently visited the stores. In articles for The Bee, he challenged store 
managers on their overall performance and in his statistical reports, he focused as much 
on sales and margin as on expenses.39 The Accounting Department had a similar 
performance bias and proudly proclaimed how, through the provision of statistics, they 
were ‘out to make the business as profitable as possible’.40 Whatever the department, 
the focus was on the overall objectives of the business rather than the functions specific 
role and this was encouraged through competitions such as the annual ‘October Cup’ 
where each director took responsibility for three territories and competed with the other 
directors on who could deliver the biggest sales growth in the month. 41 
Organisationally, the link between the stores and the Directors was provided by 
Territorial General Managers who reported directly into the Executive; narrow reporting 
lines offsetting the complications caused by up to 28 people reporting directly to the 
Executive.42 The TGM was a new role created in 1920 and a copy of the American 
system.43 Previously, a team of regional inspectors and auditors had focused on store 
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compliance.44 The new role was quite different and arguably the core performance 
oriented role in the new structure. As Gales explained: 
‘The very size of a business of this kind, and its scattered nature, makes it 
imperative that everything possible be done to promote contact and understanding 
between headquarters and branches, and that simple and direct methods be devised 
to get quick action and decision on important matters.’45 
The TGM was responsible for about 30 stores and the role had two essential 
components. The first was about knowledge and learning. TGM’s were a conduit for 
information flowing from Head Office to store managers. They also passed on their own 
knowledge and challenged store managers on their capability. A letter sent to the 
TGM’s in the early 1930’s encouraged them to question store managers on operations 
(‘Can you wrap a parcel? Do it.’), selling (‘Are you a salesman?’) and staff 
management (‘How much help are you giving your staff’). They encouraged managers 
to look outwards, challenging them on the average earnings of the local community and 
the make-up of local industry.46 Conspicuously absent in the letter was any reference to 
how the TGM could use the measures and statistics available in the store. Their local 
knowledge also flowed upwards. Each TGM wrote a weekly performance report to the 
Chairman, a practice which continued into the 1960’s and, a TGM representative joined 
the weekly Executive meetings from 1924 because ‘it is the desire of the Executive 
Committee to keep in even closer contact with the Retail Branches.’47 
The second significant component of the TGM role was the management of the 
people he was responsible for. This included identifying and developing individuals for 
promotion. When store managers were promoted to TGM, The Bee highlighted the 
leadership and management qualities rather than any financial successes they had 
achieved. 
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Performance processes 
Planning and targeting performance 
Boots did not produce its first corporate plan until 1978 although it was recognised that 
informal plans had existed in the past.48 While there are no references to even informal 
plans in the 1920’s and 1930’s, corporate investment activity, capital forecasting, AGM 
announcements and internal commentaries suggest the business was following, at the 
very least, broad long-term principles consistent with their objectives. Operational 
‘planning’ may also have taken place at a local level. TGM’s were expected to 
understand the local economy and competitors, to identify new sites and to encourage 
new ideas in the stores they were responsible for.49  
If there were plans, they were not translated into formal targets or budgets for 
stores. Although multiple retailers in the US were already experimenting with budgets, 
Boots only used targets (quotas) for short-term sales promotions.50 For operational 
expenditure, managers were given ’standards’ to follow on the most significant items - 
salaries (ratio to sales) and purchases (stock standards).51 However, these were not so 
much an operationalisation of plans but controls on expenditure. Otherwise it appears 
the ‘target’ was simply to maximise sales growth. 
Evaluating performance 
Formally, the Executive met every Tuesday afternoon at 4.00pm to evaluate 
performance; the timing dictated by the availability of sales information. They were 
presented with comparative sales, customer numbers and product segmentation.52 
Interpretation was helped by a TGM attending the meeting and weekly reports from 
each TGM on the stores they had visited in the week.53 However, despite generating 
monthly and annual statistical reports, there are no other references to monthly, 
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quarterly or even annual meetings where performance was formally evaluated. It may 
have been that they were discussed in the weekly meeting or gaps in the sources. 
For evaluating the individual performance of store managers, Boots had formal 
processes from at least 1922. The personnel records of store managers included a ‘log’ 
of reflections on their performance added to over many years by each Head Office 
visitor to the store. With three to four entries a year in the 1920’s (but fewer in the 
1930’s), it was relatively easy to monitor the progress of the manager over several 
years. Comments were unstructured and subjective (e.g. ‘business policy is conservative 
and he is rather afraid to take a chance’). By 1939, an Annual Staff Report was also 
completed for all store staff. Staff were graded across 16 qualitative categories ranging 
from personal qualities (loyalty) to operational capability.54 Personnel files also 
included subjective feedback but, despite the breadth of statistics available, no 
quantitative measures on the stores run by the manager. In evaluating the performance 
of store managers, Boots placed more importance on subjective opinions on leadership 
and operational capability than on the financial performance achieved. 
The formal performance evaluation processes were supplemented by informal 
processes. TGM’s visited their stores regularly, providing written feedback to store 
managers.55 Directors and senior managers also visited each branch at least three times 
a year in the 1920’s.56 John Boot claimed to have visited more than 500 stores over just 
a few months in 1922. 57 During the annual ‘October Cup’, a director could visit more 
than 100 stores in the month.58 While these visits may have appeared relatively 
infrequent from a store manager perspective, when replicated across 1,000 shops, they 
represented a significant investment in understanding performance.  
The insights from these visits represented a considerable body of qualitative 
knowledge on the performance of the store, the manager and the employees. An article 
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written by a TGM in March 1936 highlighted the breadth of knowledge. He provided a 
list of 37 factors grouped into five categories which helped store managers determine 
whether they operated a ‘five star’ branch. Of these factors, less than five were 
measured (e.g. sales growth). The remainder were subjective and had to be observed - 
evaluating the quality of the staff (‘seniors are training juniors’), the level of service 
(‘every customer receives a sympathetic enquiry of needs’) and the store environment 
(‘the branch is always clean from front door to back entrance’).59  
Visiting stores allowed TGM’s and Executive directors to not only evaluate 
whether stores were achieving each of these drivers of performance but also allowed 
them to understand the complex relationships between the external context, the different 
drivers of performance and the customer reaction to the overall experience.  
Rewarding and motivating performance 
For Executives and senior managers, the American policy was to pay a moderate salary 
and a profit based bonus.60 For store managers, reward was based on a basic salary 
supplemented by a monthly bonus based on sales growth. Additional bonuses were 
added if stock standards were maintained (July 1921) and for increases in ‘own-goods’ 
sales (1930) although both were contingent on achieving overall sales growth.61 Sales 
assistants’ bonus was brought in line in 1936 when sales commission was replaced by a 
bonus based on growth in total sales and ‘own-goods’ sales.62 
Beyond financial rewards, Boots used a range of techniques to motivate 
performance. John Boot wrote a letter every month to managers awarded a bonus and 
demonstrated a personal knowledge of every store; he congratulated them on the award 
but could also, for example, praise their ‘nicely dressed windows’ or chastise them on 
their own-goods sales compared to other local stores.63 To the store manager, the gap 
between store performance and the Directors must have seemed narrow. 
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 The Bee was similarly used to motivate performance and demonstrated the 
range of symbolic incentives used by the firm. It highlighted examples of individual 
sales successes, published Honour Rolls (e.g. the Salesmanship Roll of Honour) and 
comparative lists of Territorial performances. It was also the conduit for promoting the 
sales tournaments and competitions introduced soon after the American take over. 
These ranged from small scale inter-store tournaments through to national and 
international events. Store managers challenged each other: ‘Mr. GA Lloyd, on behalf 
of his branch, 289, Tredegar, wishes to compete with any branch of similar size in the 
sale of household soaps.’64 Larger events were coordinated by Head Office, including 
three ‘Test Matches’ where the British stores competed with the American stores on the 
sales of ‘Regefrice.’65 Rewards varied and included one week’s extra salary, a trip to 
Paris or an annual subscription to a magazine. Often, there was no tangible reward at all 
other than recognition in The Bee. 
The competitions and other techniques helped create a sales culture where staff 
were praised as ‘not mere clerks or shop assistants but Salespeople.’66 They also 
brought the shops and Head Office closer together, promoting informal ties. In the 
annual ‘October Cup’, first run in 1921, each director took charge of three territories 
and competed on who could grow sales the most. The Directors visited every one of 
their stores and The Bee reported their plans, celebrated the winners and interviewed 
managers about their successful strategies. 
Measuring performance (key performance measures) 
Before 1920, Jesse Boot had been concerned about the time it took to generate the 
statistical records and did not know the profitability of individual stores.67 In March 
1922, the Accounts Department highlighted the progress made: 
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‘The Territorial General Managers and the Branch Managers are all supplied with a 
great number of statistics relating to sales, supplies, stocks, expenses, and other 
matters…. The work of the Sales Department, the Merchandise and Expense 
Controls is almost entirely based upon statistics supplied.’68 
Despite the range of statistics generated, ‘sales’ was the key measure referred to 
in The Bee, in correspondence with stores and in the various Head Office reports.69 
Sales measures were widely reported in The Bee including ranking tables of stores and 
territories. Sales measures also dominated the statistical reporting packs used by the 
Executive (see table 3). The summary page of the annual statistical book, produced 
every year from 1925 to 1969, highlighted the importance of sales measures including 
volume of sales (customer transactions) and the value of sales (average value and one 
penny per customer).  
Table 3: Boots key performance measures - retail measures reported on the 
summary page of the Statistical Book (selected years) (near here) 
 
The detailed schedules which followed the summary page were similarly 
dominated by sales data. In 1939, the book contained 14 sales schedules but only two 
schedules related to stock and four to expenses. The sales schedules segmented the data 
geographically, by product and over time. Several schedules listed the sales of 
individual stores grouped into largest stores, smallest stores, sharpest declining or new 
stores. Directors could therefore assess the annual sales performance of the overall 
business (1939: £13.3m) and of the smallest store (£1,507) within a couple of pages; 
emphasising the importance of understanding performance at a unit level. The focus on 
sales did not reflect weaknesses elsewhere in the reporting systems. The detailed 
accounting reports demonstrated the level of detail available on expenses, stock and 
capital expenditure. 
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Two features of how Boots used measures stand out. First, there was very little 
change in the measures reported in the Statistical Books between 1925 to 1939 (and 
indeed, 1969). There were also no new non-financial measures introduced into the pack 
after 1925. The lack of new measures was despite investments made elsewhere by 
Boots in understanding sales and service - in 1929, they employed J Walter Thomson to 
conduct market research on customers and from 1928 they employed a ‘casual 
customer’ who visited shops anonymously and reported regularly in The Bee on the 
quality of service received.70 Secondly, while Boots had the ability to analyse and 
report margins, stocks and expenses in considerable detail, there was relatively limited 
reporting in the Statistical Books and little focus on these measures in The Bee or TGM 
memos. The singular focus helped reinforce the core objectives of the business. As 
Gales reminded employees, ‘sales are the lifeblood of the business. Without sales, there 
would be no necessity for anything else.’ 71 
Linking the system 
To what extent did the separate elements link to create what we might call a ‘system’? 
Even a cursory review of the structures and measures highlight the alignment between 
them and the objectives of the organisation.  
The alignment, however, was not just with what needed to be achieved (“MORE 
SALES”) but also how it should be achieved (by narrowing the gap between Head 
Office and the customer-facing staff). This emphasis highlighted that the stores were the 
primary units of performance and only by observing how sales growth was delivered in 
the store, or hearing from those who had observed it directly, could one understand how 
the various drivers of performance interacted and contributed to the overall performance 
of the business.  
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Encouraging ‘closer co-operation and co-ordination’ and ‘harmonious and 
sympathetic understanding’ between Head Office and the stores also helped develop 
relationships and loyalty - towards the firm, a store or other employees.72 One TGM 
noted the benefit for store staff of regular store visits by directors: “all realise that 
members of the Executive are human beings with an intimate knowledge of the 
difficulties that arise from day to day in the branches.” 73 The Bee (and TGM’s) 
reminded people of the importance of loyalty and its benefits were credited by at least 
one winner of the October Cup for their success.74  
In modern PMM systems, it is measures which are credited with linking the 
separate elements but despite their ability to generate relevant financial and non-
financial statistics, they played a lesser role in Boots. A clear, simple objective, a focus 
on directors developing a deep understanding of performance by spending time in the 
stores and promoting relationships and loyalty played a bigger role. 
W.H. Smith and Sons 
WH Smith and Sons (WHS) was an old family firm which had gradually added to its 
wholesale distribution business by opening bookstalls (from 1848) and retail stores 
(from 1905). The shops sold books, stationery, newspapers and magazines. It was 
managed as a partnership until 1929 when, following the death of WFD Smith and the 
need to raise capital to pay taxes, it became a private limited company. The change to 
the legal status had little impact on organisational structures and ways of doing things. 
The Smith family retained the ordinary shares and operationally the firm was managed 
under the same partnership principles established in the 19th century. Even the 
terminology remained the same - ‘Directors’ were still referred to as ‘Partners’ until the 
early 1960’s.75 Partners and Directors comprised family members and friends of the 
family. Between 1894 and 1948, every partner/ director appointment was related to an 
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existing Partner.76 
Performance objectives 
In 1936, concerned about his health, the head of the Smith family engaged a firm of 
solicitors to consider the options for minimising death duties and, in a memo sent to the 
Partners, the lawyers outlined his principal objectives: 
‘1. that he shall be in the position at his death of passing on the business and its 
control in as nearly as may be the same condition as that in which he inherited it 
and; 
2. that the future of the present Managing Directors of the Company shall be 
assured (so far as is reasonably possible) in the event of his dying before them.’77 
The first point appears unambitious; stability over growth. It reflected however, 
both a financial concern about the on-going viability of the firm and a dynastic 
determination to maintain a family business which was already 144 years old. It 
encouraged a risk averse approach to managing the business and was reflected by the 
firm’s cautious approach to investment in the 1920’s and 1930’s when they repeatedly 
wrote to senior managers forbidding further capital expenditure. 78 It was also a view 
which cascaded through the business and summed up by one senior manager writing to 
the Partners in 1930: ‘well-judged capital expenditure is the first care of every business 
man.’ 79 It is consistent with Chandler’s observation that family owned businesses 
preferred a steady return over growth. 
The second point highlighted the on-going concern the Smith family had for 
those it employed. Family meant a lot at WHS. A Partner later recalled how ‘One 
cannot help being struck by the family connections among the staff…. I believe there is 
more than one instance of four generations in direct succession if not five.’80 Longevity 
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of service was similarly prevalent and celebrated in the Firm. A patriarchal care for 
employees continued well into the 1960’s, long after the firm had become a public 
company. Commenting on David Smith who joined the firm in 1935 and retired as 
Chairman in 1969, a non-Executive director recalled that ‘he was a very fine man who 
believed himself to be the trustee of the whole business and not just of his family’s 
fortune but of every employee in it.’81 
Growth was a secondary objective. Managers sometimes wrote to the in-house 
magazine, Newsbasket, highlighting growth opportunities but there were equally others 
recommending caution. Correspondence between Head Office and with store managers 
focused on stock levels more than growth and before the 1950’s, there were almost no 
references to the need to grow the business in minutes or speeches.  
Organisational structure 
WHS in 1920 was a curious mix of centralised and decentralised operations which 
lacked an obvious logic. It had evolved slowly over the previous century and when it 
started opening shops in 1905, the larger (‘A’) shops copied the existing Wholesale 
House structure and the smaller (‘B’) shops copied the Bookstall structure. These 
structures did not change until the end of the 1950’s. 
The Partners sat together in one room and had no specific departmental 
responsibilities.82 Instead, they were expected to have a deep knowledge of all parts of 
the business but only intervened by exception. This partly reflected a management 
philosophy which delegated the running of the business to their senior managers. 
Hornby, a Partner between 1894 and 1946, wrote to a colleague that ‘I have always 
gone on the principle that it is best to let other people do the work and give them full 
responsibility as a free a hand as possible.’83 In minutes, the performance of the 
business was rarely mentioned and where it was, erred against intervention. In 1931, 
20 
poor results in the Leeds Wholesale House only warranted sending a manager from 
Head Office ‘unofficially to give advice’.’84 The following week a Board minute 
recorded that ‘Mr. CH St.J. Hornby spoke strongly against general Head Office 
interference with Wholesale House expenses. The Manager’s own self-interest should 
be considered sufficient inducement to him to keep expenses down as far as possible. 
This was generally agreed.’ 85 There were few references to performance in subsequent 
minutes. 
At an operating unit level, the Wholesale Houses and larger ‘A’ shops were run 
as independent businesses. Each manager was largely free to operate as he chose. As 
one manager later recalled, ‘the A shop manager was the kingpin, he bought what he 
liked, he sold what he liked at what price he liked.’86 There were no tiers of 
management between the store manager and the Partners. Consequently, the Partners 
had up to 70 separate ‘businesses’, which accounted for just under half the operating 
profits, reporting directly into them. 87  
The rest of the business operated through a series of Merchandise Departments 
run by experienced senior managers who were responsible for buying and supplying the 
‘B’ shops and Bookstalls. Unlike ‘A’ shops and Wholesale Houses, the ‘B’ shops and 
Bookstalls were not profit accountable. They instead focused on sales, controlling 
expenses and managing stock. Unlike ‘A’ stores, there were two tiers of management 
between them and the Partners: ‘B’ shops and Bookstalls were grouped into a series of 
districts run by a Superintendent and the Superintendents reported into a Shops/ 
Bookstalls Manager. Within this structure, the District Superintendent provided the link 
between Head Office and the individual ‘B’ stores and Bookstalls. While it was 
supposed to be a management role, in practice their work included a substantial element 
of compliance checking and stock counting.  
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In Head Office, accounting and provision of statistics was performed by the 
Balance Department. They saw themselves as a traditional accounting department 
whose primary responsibility was towards accuracy rather than analysis and 
interpretation: 
‘Here the branch balance ledgers and the statistical records are kept in much the 
same form as they were kept in the days of Mr. WH Smith and his son, his 
grandson and his great-grandsons.’88 
Not surprisingly, there was little accounting innovation. Central accountants 
were also expected to have a relatively passive role in performance management. The 
Chief Accountant was admonished by the Partners in 1919 and 1921 for writing directly 
to store managers about their figures and instructed that ‘No ‘propaganda’ work should 
be dealt with by the Balance Department.’89 A consultant report in 1956 confirmed that 
little had changed in the intervening years with more focus on ‘accounting finesses than 
management control.’90 
Performance processes 
In general, pre-1940’s WHS was a ‘process lite’ organization with few standardized 
processes and reliance on the store manager’s personal initiative.91 
Planning and targeting performance 
Before 1940, there was little evidence of formal long term planning and no evidence of 
any processes in place. The business grew and expanded into new areas but largely as a 
response to immediate crises/ opportunities and to ideas raised by employees. The 1905 
decision to invest heavily in new shops was a response to losing two bookstall 
contracts.92 During the 1920’s and 1930’s, several proposals were presented to the 
Partners by employees including a mail order business, a cheap bookshop concept and a 
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children's bookshop.93 The Partners gave serious consideration to the ideas before, in 
these cases, rejecting them. 
There is also no mention of targets, forecasts or budgets before the 1950’s. 
Performance was compared to the past, sometimes over several years and stores were 
encouraged not to exceed prior year cost to sales ratios. Informally, targeting and 
financial planning may have been more common in shops but there are few references 
in the company magazine, Newsbasket, or in correspondence. 
Evaluating performance 
In minutes, memoirs and accounting schedules, there is no evidence of any processes in 
place to regularly evaluate the consolidated performance of the business until the 
1950’s, despite the Partners meeting at least weekly from 1930. Indeed, it would have 
been hard to do so. The business could not generate a consolidated sales figure until 
1964.94 Even at departmental level, the sources are unusually silent on any formal 
evaluation processes. Instead, performance discussions took place individually. As one 
Partner recalled: 
‘all the Superintendents came up once a month to report personally to the 
Partners and we shared them out between us, and in that way kept in close 
touch with the progress made by individual branches and got regular 
assessments of the capabilities of managers and staff.’95  
There was a similar, albeit annual, process for each of the Wholesale House and 
‘A’ store managers. These also lacked process as attested to by one Wholesale House 
manager who recalled a review taking no more than five minutes with no reference to 
any measures. It was, however, after a particularly good year - meetings lasted longer in 
poorer years.96 The few references to performance in the minutes primarily related to 
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individuals and to specific issues in their store. While the Partners received quarterly 
reports, and were aware of performance issues, they managed them by exception. 
The formal processes, both in terms of evaluating the financial performance of 
the stores and the personal performance of the manager, may have been relatively 
underdeveloped but the Partners invested considerable time in informal processes. 
Personal knowledge of the performance of each store, the manager and the staff was 
important and remained a constant feature of the business throughout the period. 
Partners attended the District social events where they met both managers and 
Superintendents. Partners also visited the shops frequently. AD Power’s appointment as 
a Partner in 1911 was partly because ‘two Partners and a third doubtful one would be 
tied to the office in London more that they ought to be if personal knowledge of the 
branches is to be maintained.’97 David Smith aimed to visit every shop within a three-
year period.98 Partners visited with relevant statistics.99 Visits were unannounced and 
the main purpose was to understand how well they were run - something which, one 
recalled, became clear as soon as entering the door.100 However, there was also a 
ceremonial element to them which reinforced the role of the family. One former 
manager recalled how ‘we would bow Lord Hambleden in and bow Lord Hambleden 
out.’101 
Rewarding and motivating performance 
Across the business, salaries ranged from 100% fixed to 100% variable depending upon 
the nature of the role (see table 4).  
 
Table 4: WHS basis for remuneration (near here) 
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High levels of variable pay aligned the objectives of the store managers with 
those of the Partners. WHS incentivised managers based on their absolute profit/ sales 
rather than growth. Like the Partners, there is no evidence that this promoted risk 
taking. This was perhaps because managers were charged a cost of capital or because 
they prized steady earnings. 
There were no competitions, prizes or other incentives to promote objectives. 
Newsbasket did not publish comparative results nor mentioned the performance of high 
performing individuals. While the regular visits of Partners may have motivated 
performance, it was a personal and individualised form of motivation.  
Measuring performance (key performance measures) 
The firm used a narrow selection of accounting sourced measures. In a major review of 
‘Organisation and Accounting’ in 1958, consultants were particularly critical of the 
performance management information which they argued had hardly changed since the 
turn of the century and required interpretation by a trained accountant.102 Their criticism 
of the measures should not have come as a surprise to the Partners. Superintendents in 
the 1930’s had complained about the lack of store profit information available to 
them.103 Similarly, when the Bank of England wrote to WHS in 1931 requesting certain 
statistical data, the minutes recorded that the Partners had to ‘decline politely the 
request owing to the difficulty of providing information that would be accurate.’104 
Neither request triggered any action to improve the range of measures. 
Annual aggregate statistics were recorded in the Statistical Book (1910 to 1958) 
but held only limited information, were inconsistent between the different store formats 
and went through very little change over the period (see table 5). 
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Table 5: Measures included in the WHS Statistical Book and the first year they 
were recorded. (near here) 
 
Outside the Statistical Book, the principal focus was on the use of capital. More 
statistics were gathered from store submissions on stock than on any other metric.105 
Stock measures were widely quoted in correspondence between the Balance 
Department and store managers, usually to challenge the level of stocks held and to the 
annoyance of at least one store manager ‘recognising as we do that stock must have a 
reasonable relationship to turnover.’106 
The one notable exception to the focus on financial measures was employee 
length of service. Although not included in any of the statistical books, Newsbasket 
frequently referred to the length of service of employees in articles or in quoting 
speeches.107 Length of service also determined attendance at social events where, 
symbolically, only those with 21 years’ service were invited to the company-wide 
celebrations.108 
Linking the system 
If a performance management system existed at all within WHS, the various elements 
reflected a dysfunctional mix that seemed to work despite rather than because of itself. 
And, despite known limitations, went through almost no changes during the period. 
Organisational structures appear misaligned, there were few formal processes and those 
that existed were inconsistently applied across the business. There were relatively few 
measures and these were not applied consistently across business units. Instead, 
individuals were given considerable discretion to manage the business as they saw fit. 
However, while analysing the performance management system through each of the 
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constituent parts is a practical way to understand how it operated, it ignores how the 
business managed performance as a whole. Was there a ‘system’, however loosely 
defined, which was more effective in managing the performance than simply the sum of 
the individual parts? 
In 1920, Hornby gave a speech to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the firm in 
front of over 1,000 long serving employees.109 In defining the success of the business, 
he did not talk about its financial success, indeed, he did not mention a single financial 
statistic. He did not mention the size of the business - by number of shops it was one of 
the largest in the country. He made no reference to competitors, the economy or outside 
influence. His focus was on what made WHS special and he described: 
‘a certain innate quality and inherent strength of our business: It is just that 
“intangible thing” which it is so difficult to talk about, but which has been created 
during a long period of years by generations of Smith’s men, and which is being 
created to-day by yourselves and ourselves and the initial credit for it is largely due 
to the founders of our business, the first WH Smith and his more distinguished 
son… I venture to say that their influence has permeated deeply into the inner life 
of our business, affecting unconsciously perhaps but still affecting the daily 
business lives of almost every one of us.’110 
At WHS, this “intangible thing”, what we might now call culture, had evolved 
over the previous century and was sustained by traditions, rituals and the emphasis on 
family. It helped cement the relationship between the Partners and their often 
geographically distant employees which was neatly summarised in Hornby’s 
testimonial to WFD Smith in 1928: ‘To those who worked with him and for him he 
gave the fullest measure of trust, and he was repaid by such loyal service as few 
employers can boast of.’111 ‘Trust’ and ‘loyalty’ were already well established themes 
by 1920; they had featured strongly in the first edition of Newsbasket in 1908 where the 
foreword referred to the ‘loyalty’ of the employees, the ‘bond of union’ and an ‘esprit 
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de corps.’ They also remained important long after 1939, commented upon by external 
consultants in the 1950’s and highlighted by directors in the 1970’s.112 
The importance of consistently promoting culture at WHS through speeches, 
articles and events suggests an alternative way to consider performance management 
and the constituent elements of a PMM system. Rather than focus on organisational 
structures and fixed processes held together by an integrated set of measures, 
performance can be managed through relationships and behaviours. At WHS, it was 
reflected in a system in which the Partners prided themselves on their personal 
knowledge of the business gained through store visits and personal contact but in which 
they otherwise entrusted management to manage themselves. In return they expected 
complete loyalty towards the aims of the business. 
Viewed in this way, the practices at WHS appear more consistent and integrated. 
Practices which reinforced those behaviours were more developed - reward policies 
which aligned the objectives of managers and Partners, performance review policies 
which were based on individual performance (store and manager), personal interaction 
and focus on performance by exception. Conversely, those practices which did little to 
support the behaviours (or potentially undermined them) were less developed - formal 
and prescriptive company-wide processes, collective review of collective performance, 
comprehensive measurement systems. Indeed, any reader of Newsbasket in the 1920’s 
or 1930’s might suspect that length of service was the only important measure in the 
business and, given its association with trust and loyalty, perhaps it was? 
Conclusion 
The introduction highlighted that our understanding of PMM systems, despite 25 years 
of research, remains incomplete and that there are on-going challenges to the core 
principles. The introduction proposed looking back to understand how firms in the past 
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managed performance. The findings show that many of the constituents of a modern 
system were not only present in the past but were aligned to the objectives of the 
organisation.  
Boots and WHS are only two examples but their experiences help challenge 
some current thinking and highlight areas for further research. Not surprisingly given 
their different stages of development, there were significant differences in the 
approaches the two firms adopted to managing performance but there were also 
important similarities (see table 6).  
 
Table 6: Summary of Performance Management (near here) 
 
Firstly, as current literature suggests, the cases highlight that we need to be wary 
of placing too much emphasis on the role of measures in PMM systems. Early PMM 
literature recommended a broad set of specific measures which are adapted dynamically 
as the environment and strategy change. More recently, there have been calls for more 
subtlety in how measures are used in organisations and the need to consider more 
closely the environment in which the firms operate.113 The cases of Boots and WHS 
endorse the view. Both firms used a core set of measures in interactions with stores and 
did not add to these core measures over the period. This simplified communication of 
the primary objectives of the organisation. It also reduced the risk of measures 
becoming a constraint. In both firms the primary unit of performance was the store and 
these stores operated in a diverse range of environments – a small store in an affluent 
part of rural Oxfordshire faced different challenges from a large store in inner-city 
Manchester. Operating with a narrow range of core measures provided the flexibility for 
managers to tailor their approaches to their local environments. Melnyk et al., based on 
studies of current PMM systems, make a similar point although they argue that it is 
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volatile environments changing over time rather than the differences between 
environments which encourages firms to maintain their existing set of measures.114 
These findings highlight that in certain cases, retaining a general set of measures over 
long periods outweighs the advantages of changing them. However, our understanding 
of where these cases arise is still weak. Further research will allow us to add to these 
examples. Firms which operate across several different complex environments such as 
multi-national corporations or firms which delegate much of the decision making to 
their operating units may be particularly fruitful areas for research. 
Secondly, in both firms, each director was expected to have a deep 
understanding of the overall performance of the business – a holistic perspective rather 
than a narrow functional one. For them, this meant understanding performance at the 
point that it was delivered to the customer – the store. Observing performance first hand 
by visiting stores, or receiving information directly from those who did (TGM’s/ 
Superintendents) provided information beyond raw measures. It allowed the directors to 
qualitatively understand the impact of those drivers hard to measure (e.g. store manager 
capability) but, more importantly, how drivers interacted to deliver the objectives This 
approach contrasts with the more formal frameworks and scorecards of PMM systems. 
The findings cannot be dismissed as historical anomalies – both Mintzberg and Johnson 
stress the importance of directors having a deep personal understanding of the 
performance of the business and that this is best achieved by spending more time on 
‘the ground’ and interacting with those responsible for delivering the performance. 
Johnson noted the benefits for senior managers - ‘it shows a deep appreciation that 
results (and problems) ultimately emanate from and are explained by complex processes 
and concrete relationships, not by abstract quantitative relationships that describe results 
in simple, linear abstract terms.’115 Johnson ascribes the approach to Japanese 
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management techniques observed at Toyota but directors at both Boots and WHS would 
have recognised the practices.  
The flat structure and the informal practices which brought directors and 
employees into close and regular contact not only helped improve understanding of 
performance but also helped link the system. In PMM systems, the objectives and 
strategy are communicated throughout the organisation by a set of linking measures.116 
In both case studies, the need for measures as a tool for linking the performance 
management system was reduced by the flat structure and the regular interaction of the 
directors with the retail staff. Information flowed to the directors about performance but 
also flowed directly from the directors to the staff. This regular contact also fostered 
close relations between employees and directors and helped build a strong sense of 
loyalty towards the business and its objectives. The importance of these informal 
processes to PMM, both in terms of developing understanding and in building 
relationships, suggests further opportunities for research. This could include not only 
the processes themselves but also in the methods used by firms to promote such 
contacts – in modern retailers, for example, directors continue to visit stores extensively 
and to encourage contact between Head Office staff and stores.117 Plus ça change! 
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Notes 
1 It remains one of the most cited articles of the Harvard Business Review (“Decades of 
Influence” Harvard Business Review, November 2012. Harvard Business Reviews 10 Must 
Reads: The Essentials. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2010.). 
2 Neely, “Revolution”. In 2010, Taticchi et al. identified 6,618 articles published on 
performance measurement across 546 journals, 91% published since 1991. 
3 Lebas, “Performance Measurement”. 
4 Kaplan and Norton, “Using”; “Mastering”. 
5 Bititci et al., “Integrated”. 
6 Following Melnyk et al. “fit for the future”. 
7 Bourne et al. “Emerging Issues”; Melnyk et al. “fit for the future”; Franco-Santos et al., 
“Contemporary”. 
8 Johnson, “Former Management Accountant”. 
9 Bourne et al. “Emerging Issues”, 117; Bititci et al., “Challenges”, 318. 
10 Bititci et al., “Challenges”; Bourne Handbook; Johnson and Kaplan, Relevance Lost; Ansoff, 
Implanting. 
11 Ferreira and Otley, “Design”. 
12 Otley, “Performance Management”. 
13 Stringer, “Empirical”. 
14 Scranton, “Beyond Chandler”; Evans, Defence of History; Bloch, Historians Craft. 
15 Maclean et al., “Conceptualizing”; 2016, Godfrey et al. “What is organisational history”; 
Decker et al. “New business histories”; Bucheli and Wadwhani, Organisations in Time. 
16 Kipping and Üsdiken, “More than meets the eye”. 
17 David, Retail; McNair and David, Problems; McNair, Retail Distribution; McNair and 
Gragg, Retail Store Management; McNair et al., Problems in Retailing. 
18 Hodge, Retail Accounting, x. 
19 Hayward and White, Chain Stores. 
20 Chandler, Scale; Fear, Organizing Control; Jones, Renewing. 
21 Grenier, “Evolution”. 
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22 Retail Chemists." Financial Times [London, England] 24 Sept. 1907: 8. Financial Times. 
Web. 
23 Chapman, Jesse Boot. 
24 Greenwood, Cap argues that this was partly through failing health, a desire to fund a 
university in Nottingham and lack of confidence in his son. 
25 Hayward and White, Chain Stores. 
26 Chapman, Jesse Boot. 
27 The Bee, November 1921. 
28 BTC A 49/3 - Memorandum on the Peat Report by FA Cockfield, November 1966. 
29 The Bee, July 1925. 
30 ‘Own Goods supplies grew by 34% between 1930 and 1934 while overall sales were largely 
flat. BTC Finance Report (unreferenced). 
31 From 39.6% in 1922 to 48.5% in 1939 (BTC 461 - Statistical Books 1923/24 to 1941). 
32 “The Development and Organisation of Boots Pure Drug Company Ltd” - an address to LSE 
March 1959 by Cockfield (unreferenced) and Greenwood (1977). 
33 The Bee, February 1924. Description of speech given by Gales in March 1923. 
34 John Boot and JE Greenwood (Greenwood 1977). The Bee reported a regular flow of senior 
managers across the Atlantic, especially in the early 1920’s (The Bee, December 1921; July 
1923; March 1927; Memo’s re TGM’s (BTC A361/3). 
35 Greenwood, Cap. 
36 "Boots Pure Drug Report." Financial Times [London, England] 9 May 1923: Financial 
Times. Web.  
37 The Bee, March 1922. 
38 Greenwood, Cap. 
39 Chapman, Jesse Boot; The Bee, January 1922; BTC 345/2 Expenses Report. 
40 The Bee, March 1922. 
41 The Bee, December 1922. 
42 19 Territories in 1922 (The Bee, September 1922) and 28 in 1939 (BTC 461 – Statistical 
Books 1923/24 to 1941). 
43 BTC A 361/3 Memo’s re TGM’s (5 August 1920). 
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44 The Bee, August 1922. 
45 BTC A 361/3 Memo’s re TGM’s (5 August 1920). 
46 BTC A 89/33 - Role of the Territorial General Managers (undated but c. mid-1930’s). 
47 BTC A 361/3 Memo’s re TGM’s (31 April 1924). 
48  BTC 2555/1 The Corporate Plan 1978. 
49 BTC A 89/33. 
50 The Bee, September 1922; September 1923. 
51 The Bee, February 1922; March 1923. 
52 The Bee, July 1922 - all but 27 stores submitted on time. 
53 BTC A 89/33. 
54 BTC 298 - Personnel file of store manager. The only copy relates to 1940 but the log starts in 
1922. 
55 The Bee, March 1928 includes a humorous version. 
56 Based on entries in the logs on the personnel files of store managers (BTC 298). 
57 The Bee, December 1922. 
58 The Bee, December 1922. 
59 The Bee, March 1936. 
60 Greenwood, Cap. Greenwood only refers to the Executive but based on accounting reports, 
bonuses were also payable to senior managers (including TGM’s). 
61 BTC A 129/7 - Various Memo’s TGM’s. 
62 BTC 780/5 - Sales and Increased Sales Bonus Scheme (1 March 1936). 
63 BTC A 129/ 2 - Various memos to TGM’s and Branch Mgrs (Burton store February and 
August 1921). 
64 The Bee, March 1922. 
65 The Bee, September 1922. 
66 The Bee, September 1922 
67 Greenwood, Cap. 
68 The Bee, March 1922. 
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69 Even the ‘Expense Report’ had as many pages devoted to sales as expenses. BTC 345/2 - 
Expense Report 12 months ended March 31, 1932.  
70 BTC A 48/1; The Bee, November 1928 and frequently thereafter.  
71 The Bee, April 1924.  
72 Explanations for creating the TGM structure. BTC A 361/3 Memo’s re TGM’s (5 August 
1920). 
73 The Bee, December 1922. 
74 The Bee, March 1922. 
75 Newsbasket, July 1960. 
76 Wilson, First. 
77 Memo from Bircham & Co WHS 912/7, 8 October 1936. 
78 WHS 215 minute book: 26/11/23, 24/09/25, 25/9/29 and WHS Y 119: 7/7/31 
79 WHS 452 - Letter from G Marshall to the Partners 21/2/1930 (Manager of Stationery 
Department) 
80 WHS PA 445 50 Years in the Book trade. Reminiscences of AD Power. Undated but c. mid-
1950’s. 
81 WHS Q 14 Reminiscences: Non-executive director (1910-87). 
82 Numbers varied over the period but there was never more than seven. 
83 Letter from Hornby to Power referred to in the written reminiscences of AD Power: 50 Years 
in the Book trade (WHS PA 445). 
84 Minute Book 22 June 1931 (WHS Y 118). 
85 Minute Book 29 June 1931 (WHS Y 118).  
86 WHS Q 17 Reminiscences: A J Watson (1916-82) & C G Baker (1916-2000) (Area Managers 
to 1978/79) recorded 15 Aug 1979. 
87 Balance sheet and accounts WHS X 161. Their share of profit ranged between 30% and 60% 
over the period. 
88 Talking Shop, January 1951 in an article written by the Accounts department to explain their 
structure and role. 
89 WHS 215 Partners Minute Book: 1911 – 1933 (2 December 1921). 
90 WHS 798: Retail Practices Report 29 June 1956. 
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91 WHS 798: Retail Practices Report 29 June 1956. 
92 History of the firm in a Newsbasket supplement October 1920. 
93 WHS 156: Cheap Books Scheme; WHS Y 119 - Minute Book 1931/32 (29 February 1932 
and 2 May 1932); WHS Y 120 - Minute Book 1933/35 (10 December 1934). 
94 ‘WH Smith & Son Ltd. Study of Internal Performance Years 1960/61 to 1967/68’ conducted 
by Peat Marwick, included in WHS 554.  
95 WHS 285: Photo/ letters/ speeches M Hornby. 
96 WHS Q 10 Reminiscences: K A Jessup (1914-2002), H A Johnston (1907-81); W Spicer 
(1909-81), C E Woodhurst (1910-88); recorded 14 Feb 1979. 
97 WHS 87/1 Letters on ADP partnership 1910 - 1911, 1923, 1928. 
98 WHS Q 17. 
99 WHS Q 31 Reminiscences: P W Bennett (1917-96); May 1982. 
100 WHS Q 9: Reminiscences: Lady Helen Smith (1908-2003); 10 January 1979. 
101 WHS Q 17.  
102 Report No. 17: (30/4/58). Part of WHS 799: Organisation and Accounting (10 September 
1956).  
103 Memo to Partners from Superintendent Conference January 1932. Part of WHS 588 
Minutes/Papers: Directors' Informal Meetings; 1952-55. 
104 WHS Y 119 - Minute Book 1931/32 (14 December 1931). 
105 Stock turnover by product group, stock age, number of stock lines and stock depreciation. 
WHS X 3 Balance sheets and accounts: 19 A shops various years (1920 - 1958). 
106 Bournemouth store manager 31 May 1929. WHS X 3. 
107 For example - Newsbasket October 1920 included a list of the employees with more than 50 
year’s service, January 1922 there is a description of a dinner where the average length of 
service of the 65 guests was 24 years, May 1922 there is a photo of the 25 members of the 
Newspaper dispatch department who had an average length of service of 46 years. 
108 WHS Q 15 Reminiscences: Hon. J Smith (1906-80); 26 June 1979. 
109 The firm was more than 120 years old but they were not aware at the time. Long serving 
defined as more than 21 year’s service, about 10% of the workforce. 
110 Newsbasket November 1920. 
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111 Newsbasket July 1928. 
112 WHS 799 - Organisation and Accounting Report No. 4, 1956 and Q series of reminiscences. 
113 Bourne et al., “Emerging Issues”. 
114 Melnyk et al. “Fit for the future”. 
115 Johnson, Lean Dilemma, 8. Mintzberg has consistently argued that directors need to spend 
more time with employees and observe first-hand how the business is operating, e.g. Mintzberg, 
Musings; Managing; on management. 
116 Franco-Santos et al, Contemporary. 
117 At Walmart, the CEO explained at a strategic update on 1 April 2015 that he had spent his 
first 8 months visiting and working in stores (https://seekingalpha.com/article/3046106-
walmart-stores-wmt-u-s-strategic-update-conference-call-transcript). At Tesco, the new Chief 
Executive initiated a programme in 2014 requiring every member of Head Office to spend a day 
a fortnight in store over a three-month period (The Grocer 1 October 2014 
http://www.thegrocer.co.uk/channels/supermarkets/tesco/dave-lewis-orders-tesco-hq-staff-back-
to-shop-floor/372088.article) 
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Table1: Framework 
 Questions 
Performance objectives What were the key factors believed to be central to the 
organisation’s overall future success and how were 
they brought to the attention of managers and 
employees? 
Organisational structure What was the organisation structure and what impact 
did it have on the design and use of performance 
management structures and systems? How did it 
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influence and how was it influenced by the 
performance management processes? 
Performance management processes: 
- Planning and targeting 
performance 
What strategies and plans did the organisation adopt 
and what were the processes and activities that it 
decided were required for it to ensure success? How 
did it go about setting appropriate performance targets 
for its key performance measures?  
- Evaluating performance What processes (formal and informal) did the business 
use to evaluate individual, group, and organisational 
performance? Were performance evaluations primarily 
objective, subjective or mixed? 
- Motivating (including 
rewarding) performance 
How did the firm motivate employees to deliver the 
performance of the business? What was the mix of 
financial and non-financial rewards? 
Measuring performance What were the key performance measures? How 
frequently did they change? How were they specified 
and communicated and what role do they play in 
performance evaluation? Were there significant 
omissions? 
Linking the system How were the separate structures and systems linked 
(if at all)? How strong were those links? How did they 
change over time? 
Sources: Ferreira and Otley, “The design and use of performance management 
systems”; Otley, “Performance management: a framework for management control 
systems research”; Stringer, “Empirical performance management research”. 
 
Table 2: Chronological Summary 
Boots Date WHS 
 1792 Firm founded by HW Smith selling 
newspapers in London. 
 1829 Business starts to expand as it focuses on 
wholesale distribution of newspapers. 
 
41 
                                                                                                                                               
 1848 Start multiple retailing after they contract 
with London & North-Western Railway to 
operate bookstalls on station concourses. 
Contracts follow with other railway 
companies. By 1902, they had 779 
bookstalls. 
 1853 Open first regional Wholesale House 
(Birmingham). More follow and by 1920 
there were 36 Wholesale Houses.  
Jesse Boot leaves school at 13 and works 
full time in the family shop in Nottingham 
selling herbal remedies. 
1863  
Firm incorporated as Boot and Company 
Limited selling a range of products 
including proprietary medicines. 
1883  
Becomes a public limited company (Boots 
Pure Drug Company) with four branches. 
Boot holds the controlling shares. Expands 
rapidly through organic growth and 
acquisition. By 1900, they had 181 stores. 
1888  
Develops a larger store format by creating 
a departmental structure offering a 
dispensary, perfumeries, toiletries and 
‘fancy goods’.  
1891 WFD Smith (1868 - 1928) succeeds his 
father as head of the business. His good 
friend, CH St J Hornby becomes a Partner 
in 1894 (and retires in 1946).  
 1905 Loss of two railway contracts leads to the 
opening of high street stores. By the end of 
1908, they have more than 200 stores 
generating half the sales of the bookstalls. 
Jesse Boot sells the whole business to 
United Drug Company of the United 
States. Jesse Boot remains as nominal head 
of the business. His son (John) has 
effective operational control as head of the 
Executive Committee. 
1920  
Statistics  1920/21   
Retail Sales (£’000)  8,743   4,129 
Group Profit (£’000) 289  287 
Number of stores 626  853 
 1928 WFD Smith dies. Succeeded by WH 
Smith (1903 – 1948), his eldest son. 
 1929 WHS becomes a private limited company. 
Shares held by the Smith family. 
Statistics 1930/31  
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Retail Sales (£’000)  10,094   4,461 
Group Profit (£’000) 674   133 
Number of stores 911   926 
Boots sold and becomes a public limited 
company with John Boot as Chairman. 
1933  
Statistics 1939/40  
Retail Sales (£’000)  13,777   4,876 
Group Profit (£’000) 720   201 
Number of stores 1,210   999 
Sources: Chapman, Jesse Boot; Wilson, First with the News; Greenwood, Cap; BTC 461 - 
Statistical Books; WHS X 15 - Statistical Book. 
 
Table 3: Boots key performance measures - retail measures reported on the 
summary page of the Statistical Book (selected years) 
Measure (current and prior year) 1925 1930 1939 
Sales (£):    
Expenses (£) -   
Salaries (£) -   
Number of employees    
Customer transactions (no.)    
Average value per customer transaction (£)    
One penny per customer (£)a    
Number of branches    
Number of branches opened in the year    
Number of branches closed in the year    
Comparative shops (open two complete years)    
Retail sales (£)    
Customer transactions (no.)    
Average value per customer transaction (£)  - - 
a Potential increase in total sales for each penny increase in the average transaction value 
Source: BTC 461 - Statistical Books 1923/24 to 1941 
 
Table Error! Main Document Only.: WHS basis for remuneration 
 Basis Variable pay basis 
Smith family Primarily fixed   
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Partners and Departmental 
Managers 
Fixed salaries but 
also a potentially 
large variable 
element 
Share (up to 10%) of the Firm/ 
Departmental profit after cost of 
capital. 
‘A’ Store/ Wholesale House 
Managers 
Primarily variable 
(up to 100%) 
Share (typically 20%) of their 
store/ wholesale house profit after 
cost of capital. 
‘B’ Store/ Bookstall Manager Primarily variable 
(up to 100%) 
Share (up to 5%) of their store 
sales. 
Store staff Fixed Sales commission was introduced 
in 1933 but soon abandoned 
Source: WHS 1090: Review of Retail Managers Pay Structure; WHS 215 Partners Minute Book 1911 
– 1933. 
 
Table 5: Measures included in the WHS Statistical Book and the first year they 
were recorded. 
 ‘A’ Stores ‘B’ Stores Bookstalls 
£ annual sales and % growth in sales  1914 1914 1910 
£ sales by type of merchandise (at 
cost price) 
1938 Never Never 
£ sales by type of merchandise (at 
selling price) 
Never 1914 1910 
% gross margin 1914 Never Never 
£ expenses by type of expense and % 
ratio to sales 
1914 1914 1910 
£ and % net profit 1914 Never Never 
Stock turnover Never 1929 1929 
Debt (on credit sales) by age Never 1929 1929 
Cash deficiencies and overpayments Never 1914 1910 
Source: WHS X 15 Statistical Book 1910 - 1958 
 
 
Table 6: Summary of Performance Management 
 Boots WHS 
Performance 
objectives 
 Sales Growth  Capital maintenance and a steady 
return on capital 
Organisational 
structure 
 New structure created in 1920/21 
based on the existing retail structures 
of the parent company. 
 Structure evolved over the previous 
century. Little alignment between 
different parts of the business. 
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 Flat structure – only one tier of 
management between stores and 
directors (the TGM). 
 Little change in structure over the 
period. 
 Flat structure - the largest 
businesses (‘A’ stores/ Wholesale 
Houses) reported directly to the 
Partners. Two tiers between smaller 
stores and the Partners. 
 Little change in structure over the 
period. 
Performance management processes:  
Planning and 
targeting 
performance 
 Evidence of long term planning 
aligned to objectives but no formal 
processes. 
 No budgets but control over costs 
through standards. 
 No formal processes. Investment 
influenced by crises/ opportunities 
and the initiative of employees. 
 No budgets/ standards. 
Evaluating 
performance 
 Formal review:  
Directors undertook a collective 
review of performance at least 
weekly. Review involved direct input 
from TGM’s though a weekly report 
to the Chairman and attendance at the 
weekly Executive meeting 
 
 Informal qualitative evaluations: 
Regular store visits by directors to 
stores aiming to get a holistic 
understanding of the performance 
of the business. 
 
 Formal review:  
Partners individually met 
Superintendents monthly and ‘A’ 
store/ Wholesale House managers 
annually. 
 
 Informal qualitative evaluations: 
Regular store visits by directors to 
stores aiming to get a holistic 
understanding of the performance 
of the business. 
 
 
Motivating 
(including 
rewarding) 
performance 
 Aligned to performance objectives. 
 High fixed/ low variable 
remuneration. 
 Variable element based on growth in 
sales. 
 Use of a broad range of symbolic 
incentives. 
 Aligned to performance objectives. 
 Low fixed/ high variable 
remuneration (with exceptions). 
 Variable element based on absolute 
profit or sales. 
 
   
Measuring 
performance 
- Core measures aligned to 
performance objectives (sales). 
- Supported by a wide range of 
statistics.  
- Little development in measures 
over the period. 
- Core measures aligned to 
performance objectives (capital). 
- Supported by a limited set of 
financial measures. 
- Little development in measures 
over the period. 
Linking the system - Informal regular contacts between 
senior managers and store staff 
facilitating on-going 
communication of objective. 
- Emphasis on loyalty to align 
employees to objective. 
- Informal regular contacts between 
senior managers and store staff 
facilitating on-going 
communication of objective. 
- Reliance on a common culture to 
align employees to objective. 
 
 
